Corporate governance challenges and opportunities in mitigating corporate fraud in Malaysia

• Published in: Journal of Financial Crime
• Main Author: A. Girau E.; Bujang I.; Paulus Jidwin A.; Said J.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Emerald Group Holdings Ltd. 2022
• Online Access: https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85108977256&doi=10.1108%2fJFC-02-2021-0045&partnerID=40&md5=4986d8db91e134eea7bb94630540a407

Purpose: This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and the likelihood of corporate fraud in Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach: The sample of fraudulent companies in this study is the public listed companies that were charged with furnishing false statements to the Securities Commission of Malaysia and Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad and was listed in the Malaysian Securities Commission Enforcement Release from the year 2000 to 2016. The non-fraudulent companies, which are the control companies in this study, were selected from public listed companies listed in Bursa Malaysia, based on their similarity to the fraudulent companies in terms of time, size and industry type. The panel probit regression analysis was used to examine the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and the occurrence of corporate fraud. Findings: The findings of this study suggest that board size and executive directors’ compensation are the corporate governance characteristics that can effectively combat corporate fraud incidences in Malaysia. The corporate governance features, namely the board of directors’ independence, frequency of board meetings, CEO duality, CEO’s age, and share ownership owned by directors and CEO, do not significantly influence corporate fraud incidences in Malaysia. Originality/value: Although previous studies provide inconsistent findings on the association between board size and corporate fraud incidences, this study contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence that smaller board sizes provide more effective monitoring functions to minimize corporate fraud incidences in the Malaysian context. The empirical evidence also supports the agency theory proposition where managers with high compensation will act in the best interest of shareholders and less likely to focus on their interests, thus deterring them from committing fraudulent acts. © 2021, Emerald Publishing Limited.