Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review

This paper looks at managerial diversion and agency theory and how both arguments may be applied to describe the governance practices and performance of state-owned enterprise companies in Indonesia. Managers are the main focus of the approaches, on the assumption that managers tend to expropriate t...

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Published in:International Journal of Financial Research
Main Author: Jahja J.; Mohammed N.F.; Mohamed N.; Lokman N.
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Sciedu Press 2020
Online Access:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85096295622&doi=10.5430%2fijfr.v11n5p510&partnerID=40&md5=b36dd031ab99076daf302e6d47848f01
id 2-s2.0-85096295622
spelling 2-s2.0-85096295622
Jahja J.; Mohammed N.F.; Mohamed N.; Lokman N.
Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
2020
International Journal of Financial Research
11
5
10.5430/ijfr.v11n5p510
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85096295622&doi=10.5430%2fijfr.v11n5p510&partnerID=40&md5=b36dd031ab99076daf302e6d47848f01
This paper looks at managerial diversion and agency theory and how both arguments may be applied to describe the governance practices and performance of state-owned enterprise companies in Indonesia. Managers are the main focus of the approaches, on the assumption that managers tend to expropriate the firms’ and shareholders’ value for their own benefit instead of looking for ways to maximize shareholders’ value and fulfill their stakeholders’ needs. Indonesia is selected because it has the highest number of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) companies among the ASEAN countries. The government holds more than 51 percent of the shares and has a unique governance structure with two-tier boards to manage and run the companies. Besides, most of Indonesia’s SOE companies have a tight connection with Indonesia’s political party. With these characteristics, the agency problem in Indonesia's SOE companies is more prevalent compared to other listed SOE companies. The managerial diversion, which is linked to corruption, might be the principal critical factor that hinders SOE companies from performing well. Thus, even with the introduction of a good corporate governance score by the Indonesian government, which is imposed on SOE companies, it may not be able to improve the overall financial performance of SOEs as well as governance practice in the companies. This paper's objective is to review and examine prior literature on corporate governance and managerial diversion from the perspective of state-owned enterprise companies in Indonesia. © (publication year), (publisher). All rights reserved.
Sciedu Press
19234023
English
Article
All Open Access; Gold Open Access
author Jahja J.; Mohammed N.F.; Mohamed N.; Lokman N.
spellingShingle Jahja J.; Mohammed N.F.; Mohamed N.; Lokman N.
Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
author_facet Jahja J.; Mohammed N.F.; Mohamed N.; Lokman N.
author_sort Jahja J.; Mohammed N.F.; Mohamed N.; Lokman N.
title Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
title_short Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
title_full Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
title_fullStr Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
title_full_unstemmed Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
title_sort Corporate Governance, Managerial Diversion, and Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises: A Literature Review
publishDate 2020
container_title International Journal of Financial Research
container_volume 11
container_issue 5
doi_str_mv 10.5430/ijfr.v11n5p510
url https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85096295622&doi=10.5430%2fijfr.v11n5p510&partnerID=40&md5=b36dd031ab99076daf302e6d47848f01
description This paper looks at managerial diversion and agency theory and how both arguments may be applied to describe the governance practices and performance of state-owned enterprise companies in Indonesia. Managers are the main focus of the approaches, on the assumption that managers tend to expropriate the firms’ and shareholders’ value for their own benefit instead of looking for ways to maximize shareholders’ value and fulfill their stakeholders’ needs. Indonesia is selected because it has the highest number of State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) companies among the ASEAN countries. The government holds more than 51 percent of the shares and has a unique governance structure with two-tier boards to manage and run the companies. Besides, most of Indonesia’s SOE companies have a tight connection with Indonesia’s political party. With these characteristics, the agency problem in Indonesia's SOE companies is more prevalent compared to other listed SOE companies. The managerial diversion, which is linked to corruption, might be the principal critical factor that hinders SOE companies from performing well. Thus, even with the introduction of a good corporate governance score by the Indonesian government, which is imposed on SOE companies, it may not be able to improve the overall financial performance of SOEs as well as governance practice in the companies. This paper's objective is to review and examine prior literature on corporate governance and managerial diversion from the perspective of state-owned enterprise companies in Indonesia. © (publication year), (publisher). All rights reserved.
publisher Sciedu Press
issn 19234023
language English
format Article
accesstype All Open Access; Gold Open Access
record_format scopus
collection Scopus
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