Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?

This article explores the political economy of Islamic banking by examining the impact of political regime types, institutional environment, government and political risk on the development of Islamic banking proxied by financing or loan growth in the case of 16 Muslims majority countries with autoc...

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Published in:International Journal of Finance and Economics
Main Author: Asutay M.; Mohd Sidek N.Z.
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2021
Online Access:https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087829594&doi=10.1002%2fijfe.2011&partnerID=40&md5=6b28301a10118e5e9f79a10cb05ff329
id 2-s2.0-85087829594
spelling 2-s2.0-85087829594
Asutay M.; Mohd Sidek N.Z.
Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
2021
International Journal of Finance and Economics
26
3
10.1002/ijfe.2011
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087829594&doi=10.1002%2fijfe.2011&partnerID=40&md5=6b28301a10118e5e9f79a10cb05ff329
This article explores the political economy of Islamic banking by examining the impact of political regime types, institutional environment, government and political risk on the development of Islamic banking proxied by financing or loan growth in the case of 16 Muslims majority countries with autocratic and democratic regimes over the period of 2000–2013. The performance of Islamic banking loan growth is examined from three different perspectives—political regime and institutions, governance and political risks in both regime settings. Results suggest that loan growth is positive and significant in democratic regimes where political and civil rights are predominant. In addition, loan growths are slower during election years but higher throughout pre-election year in democratic regimes, suggesting the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent government artificially boosting the economy in preparation for the upcoming election. It is also found that the good quality of public services, policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of government's commitment to realizing the policies are vital in ensuring positive loan growth. The lack of differences in the reaction of loan growth to the governance in democratic and autocratic regimes shows some convergence in the regimes despite having significantly different political perspective. This implies that political commitment of the ruling government is vital to set forth a strong and robust Islamic banking standing regardless of its political standpoint. © 2020 The Authors. International Journal of Finance & Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
10769307
English
Article
All Open Access; Hybrid Gold Open Access
author Asutay M.; Mohd Sidek N.Z.
spellingShingle Asutay M.; Mohd Sidek N.Z.
Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
author_facet Asutay M.; Mohd Sidek N.Z.
author_sort Asutay M.; Mohd Sidek N.Z.
title Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
title_short Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
title_full Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
title_fullStr Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
title_full_unstemmed Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
title_sort Political economy of Islamic banking growth: Does political regime and institutions, governance and political risks matter?
publishDate 2021
container_title International Journal of Finance and Economics
container_volume 26
container_issue 3
doi_str_mv 10.1002/ijfe.2011
url https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85087829594&doi=10.1002%2fijfe.2011&partnerID=40&md5=6b28301a10118e5e9f79a10cb05ff329
description This article explores the political economy of Islamic banking by examining the impact of political regime types, institutional environment, government and political risk on the development of Islamic banking proxied by financing or loan growth in the case of 16 Muslims majority countries with autocratic and democratic regimes over the period of 2000–2013. The performance of Islamic banking loan growth is examined from three different perspectives—political regime and institutions, governance and political risks in both regime settings. Results suggest that loan growth is positive and significant in democratic regimes where political and civil rights are predominant. In addition, loan growths are slower during election years but higher throughout pre-election year in democratic regimes, suggesting the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent government artificially boosting the economy in preparation for the upcoming election. It is also found that the good quality of public services, policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of government's commitment to realizing the policies are vital in ensuring positive loan growth. The lack of differences in the reaction of loan growth to the governance in democratic and autocratic regimes shows some convergence in the regimes despite having significantly different political perspective. This implies that political commitment of the ruling government is vital to set forth a strong and robust Islamic banking standing regardless of its political standpoint. © 2020 The Authors. International Journal of Finance & Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
publisher John Wiley and Sons Ltd
issn 10769307
language English
format Article
accesstype All Open Access; Hybrid Gold Open Access
record_format scopus
collection Scopus
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