On the Insecurity of Generalized (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) - Advance and Adaptable Cryptosystem

• Published in: Journal of Physics: Conference Series
• Main Author: Isa M.A.M.; Rahmany N.N.A.; Asbullah M.A.; Sathar M.H.A.; Rasedee A.F.N.
• Format: Conference paper
• Language: English
• Published: Institute of Physics Publishing 2019
• Online Access: https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85076082670&doi=10.1088%2f1742-6596%2f1366%2f1%2f012021&partnerID=40&md5=3c89acfa0ac0869a1631d4a8e4bb155a

This paper explores the security claims of the Generalized (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) - Advance and Adaptable Cryptosystem, in short the GRSA-AA cryptosystem. In the GRSA-AA design proposal, the public key n is defined as the multiplication of two large prime numbers, while the values of encryption key E and decryption key D are relying on the result of multiplying 2 k large prime numbers called N where n divides N. The GRSA-AA claimed that the brute force is necessary to break the cryptosystem even if the integer n was factored. Nevertheless, this paper aims to show that this scheme is insecure once n is factored. The mathematical proof is presented to show that it is easy to generate an alternative value to the private key D without brute-forcing, yet successfully break the system. © Published under licence by IOP Publishing Ltd.